

Michigan Office of the Auditor General

REPORT SUMMARY

Performance Audit
Qualified Voter File and Digital Driver's
License Systems
Department of State and Department of
Information Technology

Report Number: 23-591-04

Released: March 2005

The Department of State operates the Qualified Voter File (QVF) System in order to maintain a single Statewide database of registered voters. It also operates the Digital Driver's License (DDL) System to electronically record, store, and query images and signatures of Michigan drivers and personal identification card applicants. The Department of Information Technology provides services to the Department of State. These services include such things as security, server operation and administration, and network communications.

Audit Objective:

To assess the Departments' effectiveness in controlling access to the central QVF database server.

Audit Conclusion:

The Departments were not effective in controlling access to the central QVF database server. Our assessment disclosed one material condition relating to QVF database server security (Finding 1). As a result, there was a significant risk that the Departments' access controls could not prevent or detect unauthorized access to the QVF database server. This could compromise the confidentiality, integrity, and availability voter registration data.

Material Condition and Agency Response: QVF Database Server Security

The Departments did not effectively secure the QVF database server (Finding 1).

Agency Response: Both the Department of State and the Department of Information Technology agreed with the finding. The Departments have continued to work together to evaluate and implement reasonable and cost-effective strategies that mitigate the level of risk to the State's QVF database server. The Departments informed us that despite vulnerabilities, they were not aware of any instances in which the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information was compromised.

Audit Objective:

To assess the Departments' effectiveness in maintaining security over confidential voter registration data during network transmission.

Audit Conclusion:

The Departments were generally effective in maintaining security over confidential voter registration data during network transmission. Our report does not include any reportable conditions related to this audit objective.

Audit Objective:

To assess the Departments' effectiveness in monitoring the third-party contractor's efforts to secure the DDL System.

Audit Conclusion:

The Departments were not effective in monitoring the third-party contractor's efforts to secure the DDL System. Our assessment disclosed one material condition related to security concerns with the DDL contract (Finding 2). Consequently, the Departments have assumed an unknown level of risk that the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of driver's license data and images could be compromised, which may lead to identity theft.

Material Condition and Agency Response: Security Concerns With DDL Contract

The Departments did not ensure that the third-party contractor effectively secured the DDL System (Finding 2).

Agency Response: Both the Department of State and the Department of Information Technology agreed with the finding. The Department of State, in consultation with the Department of Information Technology, has continued to work with the third-party contractor to effectively secure the DDL The Departments informed us System. that despite the noted risks, they were not aware of any instances in which the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of DDL System information was compromised.

A copy of the full report can be obtained by calling 517.334.8050 or by visiting our Web site at: http://audgen.michigan.gov



Michigan Office of the Auditor General 201 N. Washington Square Lansing, Michigan 48913

> Thomas H. McTavish, C.P.A. Auditor General

Scott M. Strong, C.P.A., C.I.A.

Deputy Auditor General